

Message Text

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PAGE 01 STATE 192487
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INFO OCT-01 ISO-00 /001 R

DRAFTED BY EA/J:NPLATT:BCL
APPROVED BY EA:MR. GLEYSTEEEN
S/S - MR. TARNOFF
EA/PRCM - MR. THAYER

-----025345 131438Z /53

P 131425Z AUG 77 ZFF6
FM SECSTATE WASHDC
TO AMEMBASSY TOKYO PRIORITY
INFO USLO PEKING PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY TAIPEI PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 192487

NODIS
FOR AMBASSADOR ONLY

E.O. 11652: GDS

TAGS: PFOR, US, JA, CH

SUBJECT: BRIEFING ON CHINA TRIP

1. FOLLOWING IS STRICTLY FYI FOR ALL ADDRESSEES.

2. IN RESPONSE TO FOREIGN MINISTER HATOYAMA'S REQUEST TO
AMBASSADOR MANSFIELD GLEYSTEEEN BRIEFED JAPANESE
CHARGE FUJII AUGUST 11 ON PROSPECTS FOR SECRETARY'S UP-
COMING VISIT TO PEKING. CAUTIONING FUJII THAT BRIEFING WAS
SENSITIVE AND SHOULD BE TREATED ACCORDINGLY, GLEYSTEEEN
MADE FOLLOWING POINTS:

.. AS FIRST HIGH-LEVEL CONTACT BETWEEN CARTER ADMINISTRA-
TION AND PEKING GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, VANCE TRIP WILL BE OF
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CONSIDERABLE SUBSTANTIVE AND SYMBOLIC SIGNIFICANCE. FIRST
PURPOSE OF VISIT IS TO REVIEW WITH CHINESE OUR GLOBAL
STRATEGIC POLICIES, COVERING BOTH AREAS OF COMMON INTEREST
AND THOSE ON WHICH WE DIFFER. AGENDA WILL COVER OBVIOUS
ISSUES -- RELATIONS WITH USSR (INCLUDING SALT), WESTERN
EUROPE, MIDDLE EAST, JAPAN, KOREA, SOUTHEAST ASIA, AFRICA,
ETC. U.S. SIDE WILL PRESENT ITS VIEWS OBJECTIVELY WITHOUT

ANY EFFORT TO GLOSS OVER DIFFERENCES, EXPECTING HOWEVER THAT OUR VIEWS WILL CORRESPOND ON A NUMBER OF IMPORTANT ISSUES.

4. SECOND PURPOSE WILL BE TO DISCUSS BILATERAL RELATIONS, PRINCIPALLY MAJOR ISSUE OF NORMALIZATION BUT ALSO LESSER QUESTIONS LIKE TRADE AND CULTURAL EXCHANGES. THE PRESIDENT HAS MADE NO FINAL DECISION ON THE DELICATE ISSUES SURROUNDING NORMALIZATION BUT HAS AUTHORIZED SECRETARY VANCE TO ENGAGE IN A SERIOUS EXPLORATION OF THE QUESTION. THE VISIT COULD BEGIN A PROCESS THAT WILL RESULT IN NORMALIZATION. IN ANY CASE, THE JAPANESE GOVERNMENT SHOULD NOT EXPECT THE CONCLUSION OF ANY NORMALIZATION AGREEMENT DURING THIS VISIT.

5. THE ESTABLISHMENT OF DIPLOMATIC RELATIONS WITH PEKING WOULD OF COURSE INVOLVE SUBSTANTIAL ADJUSTMENTS IN OUR RELATIONSHIP WITH TAIWAN. HOW TO MAKE THESE ARRANGEMENTS WITHOUT UNDERMINING TAIWAN'S POSITION AND JEOPARDIZING THE CONTINUATION OF VITAL INFORMAL RELATIONS WITH THE ISLAND IS THE HEART OF THE PROBLEM. OUR INTEREST IN THE SECURITY OF TAIWAN MAKES THE SEARCH FOR A SOLUTION MORE COMPLEX FOR THE UNITED STATES THAN FOR ANY OTHER COUNTRY. EVEN DISCUSSION OF THE ISSUE WILL BE DIFFICULT.

6. WHEN EXPLORING THE ISSUE IN PEKING, SECRETARY VANCE
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WILL BE GUIDED, BY THE PRINCIPLES OF THE SHANGHAI COMMUNIQUE, INCLUDING ACKNOWLEDGEMENT OF THE VIEW EXPRESSED IN THE COMMUNIQUE THAT THERE IS BUT ONE CHINA, AND THE IMPORTANCE THAT THE UNITED STATES PLACES ON A PEACEFUL SETTLEMENT OF THE TAIWAN QUESTION BY THE CHINESE THEMSELVES. SECRETARY MADE THIS CLEAR IN JUNE 29 SPEECH.

7. THE US DOES NOT KNOW HOW THE CHINESE WILL REACT. WE ARE FAIRLY CONFIDENT THAT THEY VALUE THEIR RELATIONSHIP WITH US., NOTHING HAS HAPPENED IN CHINA RECENTLY TO CHANGE THAT ASSESSMENT. AT THE SAME TIME THE CHINESE HAVE EXPRESSED CONCERN OVER CERTAIN FORMULATIONS USED BY THE US GOVERNMENT ON THE TAIWAN QUESTION, AND HAVE THEMSELVES STATED THEIR POSITION IN WAYS THAT ARE NOT HELPFUL IN THE US. WE BELIEVE THAT THE CHINESE VIEW THE VISIT AS IMPORTANT, AND HOPE THEY WILL, WORK TO MARK AN ADVANCE IN OUR RELATIONSHIP. THE US SIDE WILL GO TO PEKING CAREFULLY PREPARED FOR A SERIOUS EFFORT TO ACHIEVE THIS GOAL.

8. FUJII ASKED WHETHER SECRETARY VANCE WOULD TAKE SPECIFIC PROPOSALS TO PEKING IN CONNECTION WITH THE TAIWAN

QUESTION, OR WHETHER HE WOULD SIMPLY EXPLORE CHINESE VIEWS. GLEYSTEN RESPONDED THAT THE UNITED STATES WAS NOT TAKING TO PEKING A COMPLETE SET OF FINAL PROPOSALS WHICH COULD BE SIGNED WERE THE CHINESE TO AGREE. THE US POLITICAL SYSTEM, LIKE THE JAPANESE, REQUIRED CONSIDERABLE CON-

SULTATION AND THE ACHIEVEMENT OF A DEGREE OF CONSENSUS BEFORE NORMALIZATION COULD PROCEED. ALTHOUGH THE RESULTS OF THE VISIT WOULD BE CONDITIONAL ON THE CONSULTATIVE PROCESS, UNITED STATES PLANNED TO ENGAGE IN PEKING IN SPECIFIC DISCUSSIONS ON VARIOUS ELEMENTS OF THE PROBLEM.

9. FUJII ASKED WHETHER THE PURPOSE OF THE VISIT WAS TO FREEZE THE TAIWAN ISSUE AND TRY TO MOVE AHEAD ON OTHER
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QUESTIONS. GLEYSTEN RESPONDED, THE DECISION WAS MADE TO EXPLORE POSSIBILITIES FOR MOVING FORWARD ON THE TAIWAN ISSUE. SHOULD WE AND THE CHINESE BE UNABLE TO DO THIS, WE COULD STILL SEEK WAYS OF PROGRESSING IN OTHER AREAS. IF THE CHINESE WISHED TO TALK ABOUT OTHER ISSUES, OF COURSE, WE WOULD BE READY.

10. FUJII ASKED HOW NEW DEVELOPMENTS IN CHINA WOULD AFFECT THE RELATIONSHIP WITH THE UNITED STATES. GLEYSTEN ANSWERED THAT THE REHABILITATION OF TENG HSIAO-P'ING REPRESENTED A TEMPORARY RESOLUTION OF LEADERSHIP PROBLEMS IN CHINA AND THE EFFECTIVE ESTABLISHMENT OF A COLLECTIVE LEADERSHIP. WHILE THIS STABILIZING DEVELOPMENT WOULD PROBABLY BE HELPFUL TO RELATIONS WITH THE UNITED STATES, AT THE SAME TIME IT LEFT CHINA WITHOUT A SINGLE ALL POWERFUL LEADER. NEITHER HUA KUO-FENG, TENG HSAIO-P'ING NOR YEH CHIEN-YING HAD MAO'S STRENGTH TO DICTATE A FIRM YES OR NO. LIKE THE UNITED STATES, CHINESE ROOM FOR MANEUVER WAS LIMITED. THEY COULD NOT AGREE EASILY TO THE KIND OF FORMULA THAT WOULD BE HELPFUL IN TERMS OF US PROBLEMS. ANY COMPROMISE WITH THE APPEARANCE OF A "TWO CHINA" SOLUTION WOULD OPEN THEM TO CRITICISM. IN SUM, DOMESTIC POLITICAL SITUATION IN CHINA IS NOW MORE FAVORABLE FOR THE DEVELOPMENT OF RELATIONS WITH UNITED STATES THAN IT WAS A YEAR AGO, BUT PROBABLY NOT AS FAVORABLE AS IN 1971.

11. FUJII SAID THAT HIS GOVERNMENT WAS VERY CURIOUS WHAT MIGHT COME UP DURING CONVERSATIONS IN PEKING CONCERNING THE KOREAN PENINSULA. GLEYSTEN RESPONDED THAT THE US HAD NOT YET DECIDED IN PRECISE TERMS HOW TO DISCUSS KOREA IN PEKING. IN GENERAL THE US WOULD FEEL IT IMPORTANT TO STRESS TO THE CHINESE THAT ITS COMMITMENT TO
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FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO WHITE HOUSE PRIORITY

S E C R E T STATE 192487

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FOR DR. BRZEZINSKI ONLY

FOLLOWING REPEAT STATE 192487 ACTION TOKYO INFO PEKING
TAIPEI AUG 13

QUOTE S E C R E T STATE 192487

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UNQUOTE CHRISTOPHER

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Status: NATIVE
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TAGS: PFOR, PREL, OVIP, PDIP, US, JA, CH, TW, KN, KS, (VANCE, CYRUS R)
To: TOKYO PEKING MULTIPLE
Type: TE
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